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Abstract 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted a fragile preparation by countries and regions for epi-
demic events, exposing exacerbated nationalisms in pandemic mitigation and control actions. 
Both conditions decisively compromise the effectiveness and efficiency of pandemic control 
capacity. It is important to develop frameworks that help overcome frailties in response to 
epidemics. 
Based on a thematic literature review and discussions with multiple national and international 
entities an attempt was made to build a tool for responding to future epidemics, the Pandemic 
Preparation Framework (2PF). 
The proposed 2PF tool is aligned with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
and with international bodies, such as the European Health Emergency Preparedness and Re-
sponse Authority (HERA). It aims to be a framework for operationalizing these agreements. 
The response to pandemics must be based essentially on international action and closer col-
laboration between countries and regions. 
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Background 
Although the appearance of a pandemic 
such as the one caused by the SARS-CoV-
2 virus has been alerted since 2007 (1) and 
the Center for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) warned in 2013 (2) about the 
risks of accidents with laboratories at lev-
els 3 and 4 of 0.2%/year, the frameworks 
and necessary reactions were not devel-
oped so that one could not act with full 
preparedness. The very nature of the cur-
rent pandemic’s origin is not yet defini-
tively identified as stated recently 
(https://covid19commission.org/).  
Pandemics and epidemics will undoubted-
ly return in the current century. All the 
conditions for increased circulation of in-
dividuals, goods, climate change, contact 
with wildlife and devastation of ecosys-
tems previously untouched by humans are 
currently gathered and will worsen in the 
predictable horizon. The latter conditions 
are estimated to generate around 60-70% 
of new diseases and epidemics (3). There-
fore, we must prepare so that the Public 
Health catastrophe of COVID-19 will not 
be repeated. The countries judged to be 
most well-prepared for pandemic in 2018, 
often performed poorly. Many of the fail-
ures were attributable to political positions 
and indecision (4). We identified at least 
seven weaknesses in Western countries: 
• Passive, indecisive and slow. 
• Bureaucratic-Normative. 
• Without conceptual preparation for 
surveillance, preparation, or coor-
dination of actions. 
• Without strategic reserves of Pro-
tective Personal Equipment (PPE) 
material norsignificant hospital re-
serves (facilities and capacity). 
• Lacking pandemic response tools at 
the macro, meso and micro level. 
• Nationally centered, paying little 
attention to WHO or other interna-
tional authorities. 
• Low knowledge management and 
knowledge transfer. 
In our reading, much of this result is due to 
consecutive years of disinvestment in 
Health, especially in the last decade and 
because Public Health is usually the poor 
branch of health, the one in which little is 
invested, where little space is given to the 
preparation of people and logistics (5,6). 
This cycle should be reversed placing Pub-
lic Health as a strategic tool for national 
and international cooperation. Much can 
be done without relevant effort if the les-
sons of COVID-19 and the accumulated 
experience of decades in the surveillance 
and mitigation of effects caused by natural 
risks are considered. Therefore, we pro-
pose the creation of a framework for ap-
proaching biological risk with pandemic 
danger–the Pandemic Preparation Frame-
work (2PF). 
 
The proposed Pandemic Preparation 
Framework (2PF) 
With the 2PF, we propose a way of dealing 
with future epidemics/pandemics that can 
at least partially address the difficulties 
and problems of the seven weaknesses in 
Western countries’ health response during 
the COVID-19 crisis, as summarized 
above. 
 
− Pandemics and major epidemics 
are overcome in the Prevention 
phase. 
− When it is no longer possible to 
maintain either situation with very 
high certainty in the preventive 
phase, there must be a Planning 
and Preparation phase for a con-
crete risk. 
− Proactive response to the pan-
demic when it is already installed 
on the field. 
− The identification, prevention, 
planning of preparation and com-
bating a pandemic or major epi-
demic can only be successful 
through intensive International 
Cooperation. 
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The strategic idea is that the coordination 
of the response to an epidemic/pandemic 
must be essentially achieved at a suprana-
tional level, through adequate prior prepa-
ration and based on knowledge manage-
ment. The need for this paradigm shift was 
recently addressed at the European Union 
level, with the regulation entity proposal 
entitled “European Health Emergency Pre-
paredness and Response Authority” (HE-
RA) (4). However, with emerging diseases 
having the potential of becoming a global 
threat, a more global approach was rein-
forced by the signature of a Global Pan-
demic Preparedness Treaty by 24 world 
leaders and the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) (5). During the Twentieth century, 
the world has progressed from national to 
supranational entities whenever the Com-
mon Good is to the parties' advantage, of 
which the ultimate example will be the 
United Nations (UN). Countries have also 
learned that major crises are faced by co-
operation and have created mechanisms 
for that purpose within supranational or-
ganizations. In addition, there is an in-
creasingly globalized world where every-
thing tends to occur almost simultaneous-
ly. Only international solutions based on 
cooperation will be able to respond to ma-
jor issues since what affects a country can 
quickly become a global threat. Therefore, 
it is in the direct interest of all nations to 
participate in the elimination or mitigation 
of a risk in any country in the world. For 
example, since 2005, with the signing of 
the UN Hyogo Framework (6) for response 
actions to disasters, and later with the Sen-
dai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion (7), global targets were defined to-
wards reducing disaster consequences such 
as: mortality, affected people, economic 
loss in GDP, infrastructural damage and 
service disruption, national/local risk re-
duction strategies, international coopera-
tion, availability and access to multi-
hazard warning systems. The COVID-19 
pandemic has shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the capacity to control a pan-
demic is something that goes beyond the 
national dimension, as declared by many 
politicians (8) and scientists (9). Only 
through the highest international coopera-
tion is it possible to find appropriate solu-
tions, supply equipment volumes at an 
adequate time and acceptable prices, with 
universal standards and applicability, and 
exchange experiences to debug national 
procedures. International cooperation in a 
pandemic state has immense scope for 
progression in all fields (10). The degrad-
ing spectacle of government officials re-
directing clinical equipment at airports 
should not be acceptable (11). Many na-
tional strategies have sought only to con-
centrate the maximum level of resources 
with those who can afford them. For ex-
ample, in the case of worldwide vaccine 
distribution there is the need of interna-
tional agreement on its optimal and ade-
quate allocation instead of being focused 
in profits (12) and realpolitik (13). Interna-
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tional authority is needed to ensure re-
sources go to areas where they can be 
globally most useful and effective in com-
bating the pandemic (14). The absolute 
need for knowledge management was veri-
fied, proving to be the central element for 
an adequate fight against the pandemic. 
This element can only be appropriately 
developed in a wide-ranging, fully interna-
tionalized way and with the greatest trans-
parency. Finally, it should not happen 
again that the strengthening of local re-
sponse capacities through international 
means is minimal and appears as an insuf-
ficiency of the local political response. In 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the international 
reinforcements that existed were vestigial 
(14,15) concerning the means deployed in 
each country and always with difficulties 
articulating with the local structures that 
led to situations in which even the smallest 
help made available was not used: lan-
guage, local procedures and other com-
plexities (15). Only the creation of au-
tomatisms can change this framework for 
the integration of Health Services. The 
tactical-operational idea is that nation-
al/local actions must be part of an articu-
lated whole composed of three dimen-
sions: Prevention, Planning and Prepared-
ness, Proactive response to the pandemic. 
This means that there must also be a high 
level of international operational coopera-
tion, presenting the great challenge of re-
quiring mutual knowledge and preparation 
work. Things as simple as consolidating 
new positive cases or the lethality of a dis-
ease among countries can, in practice, be 
an impossibility when each country works 
in its own way. Consistency in case defini-
tions and ascertainment is needed, for ex-
ample, to secure cross border intelligence 
and enable accurate inter-country compari-
sons. With the ongoing COVID-19 pan-
demic threat, it must not be forgotten that 
there are other biological threats still 
emerging, as seen recently with avian in-
fluenza (H5N8) in Russia (16) and the 
African Swine Fever in Poland (17). These 
examples and other situations have been 
mainly dealt with by the national structures 
in which the threat emerges, a context that, 
despite being local, may reach the plane-
tary scale if not controlled and for which 
there is little to no international response. 
It is important to note that every nation has 
a responsibility in preventing and reducing 
disaster risk, surpassing the national-level 
interventions, including cooperation with 
other nations and regions (18). Following 
this approach, reacting promptly to a threat 
requires having previously allocated, 
trained, certified resources in sufficient 
quantity and the capacity to travel to an-
other part of the planet, if accepted and 
allowed, to immediately integrate the na-
tional structures in an environment of full 
informational transparency. Pandemic pre-
paredness investment is beyond almost all 
countries' capabilities, which greatly rein-
forces the need to be thought out globally. 
Structures such as the WHO, ECDC, CDC 
and FEMA (national level) did not have 
the resources that would have been desira-
ble at the beginning of the pandemic, ca-
pable of being sufficient to mobilize coun-
tries with the needed tenacity and re-
sources (19,20). Namely, the WHO is the 
organization naturally dedicated to having 
the above mentioned global competencies. 
However, to be able to address this issue, 
it is essential to have a great reinforcement 
of human, financial and technological re-
sources. In Western countries, the main 
Cooperation Bodies are the WHO, the Eu-
ropean Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) or the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) of CDC. 
These coordinating organisations need to 
have their skills and resources strength-
ened to be able to deal proactively and 
appropriately with the epidemic/pandemic 
risk. 
 
Proposal of an operational mesostruc-
tured 
In addition to strengthening international 
bodies whose nature leads them to a macro 
health policies approach, we propose the 
creation of a new entity, on a continental 
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scale, with national representation in each 
country for connection to health systems. 
Therefore, it has a different nature and is 
complementary to the existing bodies with 
a vocation for field action in biological 
risk situations and the capacity to strength-
en local structures designed to deal with 
disruptive health situations such as pan-
demic contexts. Considering the pandem-
ic/epidemic generating factors strongly 
related to contacts with wildlife, this entity 
should also integrate and consolidate vet-
erinary and agricultural knowledge within 
the Public Health dimension. It is possible 
to capacitate this entity for action regard-
ing other health threats besides pandemics 
(18): large-scale earthquakes, large indus-
trial accidents as happened in Bhopal (21), 
or others that by nature exceed the coun-
try's response capacity in the healthcare 
action sphere. Similar to the other risks 
already covered with this type of response, 
aid must not be read as a weakness in a 
given country but as a collective response 
to a common threat. Biohazard plans must 
be directly linked to the preparation for 
action on the field. The entity must know 
the concrete field where the threat occurs, 
the existing and missing resources, and the 
hierarchy of supply priorities for a given 
risk in a given location when the event 
occurs. The entity must also have the first 
materials available to support risk mitiga-
tion. To properly perform its functions, the 
entity needs two fundamental competen-
cies: knowledge management and emer-
gency logistics (heavy materials as modu-
lar hospitals fully equipped with devices, 
personnel and light materials as 
PPE/medicines stocks). In addition to be-
ing guided by the latest scientific evidence 
and WHO advising, it must have the ca-
pacity to analyze risk and advise policy-
makers before substantial evidence is 
gathered, whenever the need to act is more 
pressing than the evidence available at that 
time. The difficulty of many governments 
and authorities in providing clear direc-
tives was evident in the absence of scien-
tific evidence, which resulted in numerous 
delays (22). Countries that opted for the 
proposed forms of decision that were 
sometimes more crisis management than 
scientific, ended up having better results as 




Knowledge management  
The international body should have 
knowledge management competencies for 
the proactive monitoring of potential risks, 
anticipating as far as possible which bio-
logical agents have pandemic capacity 
while designing strategic and tactical re-
sponse plans that help containing the threat 
in early stages. The entity should promote 
training to national and international 
agents to interconnect, in case of a biologi-
cal threat, and field exercises to test the 
respective systems' weaknesses and pro-
vide them with tactical tools. We propose 
that the entity works on an association 
between risk and probability (Table 1). 
This will result in each continental zone 
having a Biohazard Letter that will allow 
governments to prepare conveniently, or at 
least have that opportunity.
 
Table 1. Risk identification and action priority rankings 
Risk      
Probability High Medium Low 
High 1 2 3 
Medium 2 3 4 
Low 3 4 5 
  
Note: The intersection of each risk level is 
identified as a scale from 1 to 5, in which 1 
represents a primary priority and 5 repre-
sents a lesser priority. 
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The creation of data quality assurance 
tools about the threat must also encompass 
knowledge management work, such as 




Another competence of this supranational 
entity is to have a minimum reserve of 
protective materials (field Hospitals, criti-
cal medical devices, PPE and other equip-
ment) that enable the first action against a 
pandemic, at least in the early days, until 
industrial supply chains are adapted to the 
new reality. Under this view, time is criti-
cal for prompt action and efficient crisis 
management. All threats contained in a 
first moment will be much easier to deal 
with than after spreading to large areas, as 
happened with COVID-19. The set of pro-
cedures deployed in countries should also 
be worked on towards the greatest harmo-
ny possible, at least at a level that allows 
for the reinforcement teams not to spend 
several days studying local procedures 
before starting to work (23). It must also 
be ensured that at least critical medical 
devices can interconnect. Furthermore, 
there is a need to respond to another point 
that has failed in the current pandemic data 
management. The entity should be respon-
sible for previously defining the metrics of 
morbidity and mortality, systems of data 
collection, registration, and consolidation, 
to prevent information cacophony recur-
rence in countries with different data col-
lection times, metrics, and regional data, 
among other aspects. Whatever the data, it 
must be possible to consolidate with suffi-
cient quality to be elements itself in com-
bating the pandemic. The entity’s nature is 
essentially national, but it should not be 
exhausted. For example, it must provide 
for the capacity to reinforce other similar 
national branches when necessary.  Again, 
there is a need to strengthen international 
cooperation. Still, for it to be effective, the 
types of action must be aligned between 
countries. For example, materials are com-
patible, procedures are acceptable else-
where, national laws and rules are not 
overlapped. Another critical point in creat-
ing an entity of this nature is to support 
information management/literacy of the 
populations/literacy of journalists/literacy 
of politicians about the pandemic through 
specific and specialized communication 
tools. This set of proposals represents a 
significant investment. However, no more 
than millionths of the cost that has been 
incurred so far. The current century is like-
ly to be the century of pandemics. 
 
Conclusions 
We must start preparing for the next pan-
demic. The proposal aims to present an 
organizational alternative for improve-
ments in many points that went wrong in 
the COVID-19 pandemic: international 
cooperation, scientific reading, prompt 
action, transmission mitigation, critical 
materials supply chains, decision-making 
processes, preventive action. Most West-
ern action comprised waiting and acting 
with hospital facilities until exhaustion and 
accepting successive pandemic waves as 
something natural, which is not. COVID-
19 was worse enough not to repeat without 
having learned anything. The countries 
judged to be most well-prepared for a pan-
demic in 2018, in many cases performed 
poorly. Much of the failures 
were attributable towards political posi-
tions and indecision. There is no more 
room for national approaches. If politicians 
are able to commit to these new interna-
tional mess structures, and an expanded 
and enhanced role for the World Health 
Organisation, it will be a demonstration of 
a willingness to pool sovereignty 
and recoil from the narrow-minded nation-
alism that has cost so many lives in 
this pandemic.  The world will be a safer 
place, and humanity will have stepped 
back from the cliff edge. 
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